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Recently Connolly, OrdóOez and Coughlan challenged the view that regret is partly determined by perceived re-
sponsibility for the regretted outcome [Connolly, T. Ordótiez, L.D., 8t Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsi-
bili[y in the evaluation of decision outcomes. Orgonimtional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73-
85]. In a series of experiments they manipulated whether actors arrived at an outcome through their own decision
or through a"computer assignment" over which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation did no[
affect [heir "regret measure." We show in two experimen[s [hat this null-effec[ is due [o the fact that regret was
measured by means of a general happiness assessment. In the present research we replicated the basic design of
their experiments and also found no effects of decision agency on the happiness assessment. However, the results
showed the predicted effects of decision agency when regret was directly measured. Moreover, a measure of dis-
appointment seemed [o indicate the opposite effect: People are more disappointed when a negative outcome is
caused by a computer assignment than when caused by [heir own choice. The role ofregret and disappointment in
decision making is discussed.
Regre[ is a negative, cognitively determined emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining
that nur present situation would have been better, had we acted differently (Zeelenberg, 1996, p. 6). Present
in this definition is the idea that regret stems from decisions that are "wrong" in retrospect, and hence that
there is a sense of responsibility on the part of the decision maker. If he or she had made a different deci-
sion, the outcome would have been better. This definition is partly based on a review ofempirical research
showing a relation between responsibility and regret; that is, the more a decision maker perceives him- or
herself to be responsible for a negative outcome, the more regret he or she experiences (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers,
8c ter Schure, 1989; Gilovich á Medvec, 1994). According to this approach there is no reason for regret
following negative outcomes that were not caused by the decision maker him- or herself, that he or she
could not prevent happening, and for which he or she does not feel responsible. Other negative emotions,
such as disappointment, frustration, anger, or sadness, may be experienced in these situations, but not regret.
Some theorists, however, have argued against a relation between regret and responsibility. For in-
stance, the philosopher Taylor (1985) argued that "regret but not remorse can be felt about an event for
which the decision agent does not take herself to be even just causally responsible" (p. 98). In a similar vein,
Solomon ( 1976) proposed that:
The difference between them [regret and remorse], however, is very much like the difference between
embarrassment and shame-a difference in responsibiliry. In regret, one dces not take responsibility,
blaming whatever disappointment is involved on "circums[ances beyond one's control" (p. 349).
Similar views were advanced by Landman (1993) and Rorty (1980). It is important to note that the
relation between regret and responsibility as stated by these theorists was not based on empirical investiga-
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tions. hut on logic and introspection. More recently, however, Connolly, Ordóiiez and Coughlan (1997) alsu
claimed that rcgret and responsihilih are not related, and their claim tra.~ supportcd by empirical evidencc.
In a series of e~periments they manipulated responsibilih and liiund no effccts on their measure of re~srct.
This Icd Connolly et al. to argue against a narrow detinition of regret linking it to responsibility. Instead
they appear to favor a conceptualization of regret as a broader state of dissatisfaction with an obtained ou1-
come.
Connolly e! oL (1997) provide a detailed overview of research on the relation betwecn regret and
responsibility. We will therefore not present what would be a very similar reviéw of the literaturc. However,
it is worth pointing to two addi[ional sources supporting a relation between regret and responsibility. Frijda
et aL (1989, S[udy 2) studied the extent to which 32 emotions could be differentiated. Thev found that "self
agency'' measured hy means of the question "Were you responsible for what happened or had happened'?"
~~as a typical appraisal item for regret. Shefrin and Stahnan (1986) also recognized the connection between
regret and responsibility. They argue in their study of behavior on the stock market that people prefer [o
spend their money on stocks of conventional companies (e.g., IBM) instead of unconventional ones. One
reason for this behavior is that if you invest your money in stocks of an unconventional company and prices
go down, you blame ynurself and feel regret. "HowevCr. if IBM stock drops, you'll look at the misfortune as
an act ofGod. Your choice involves little responsibility and therefore little regret, since IBM is the conven-
tional choicé (p. 57). We now briefly describe the research that led Connolly e! a!. to the conclusion that
regret and responsibility are not related.
Connolly et n!.'s (1997) artícle describes a series of five esperiments. The basic design of these ex-
periments is quite similar. Participants were presented with scenarios describing three (or sometimes two)
students who register for a required undergraduate course. In this course there are different sections, taught
by different instructors. The s[udents register and are assigned to a certain section. Just before the start of
the semester the students either had the opportunity to change to another section if they so wished (high
responsibility manipulation), or they were reassigned to sections by a computer (low responsibility manipu-
lation). The students all ended up in the same moderately good section B. For one ofthem this was the sec-
tion initially allocated. For the others the initial section was either better (section A) or worse (section C)
than section B. After reading the scenario participants were asked to answer the following question "How
Itappy overall do you think each student would be with the course section he ended up in?" on an 1 I-point
scale with endpoints labeled Very Unhappy (-5) and Very Happy (f5).
Connolly e! al. (1997) found that this rating was influenced by the initial section assignment of the
students. Participants gave highes[ ratings for the student whose initial section was worse than the section he
ended up in. Lower ratings were given for the student whose initial section was equal to the section he
ended up in, and the lowest rating was given for the student whose initíal section was better than the section
he ended up in. However, Connolly et al. did not find any effects ofthe responsibility manipulation on their
dependent variable. Thus, the ratings were independent of whether the students ended up in section B as aRegret and responsibility 3
result of their own choice or as a result of a computer reassignment. This was interpreted as indicating that
responsibility (i.e., decision agency) is not related to the experience of regret.
We believe that a critical feature of the experiments of Connolly er a!. (1997) is that they assessed
regret by means of a general happiness assessment. Had they asked participants explicitly about regret, they
should have found strong effects of decision agency. We should note here that in their Experiment 3 Con-
nolly et a1. did ask participants about regret. In this experiment the scenario involved only two students,
Alan and Bob, whose initial section assignment was either better than (Alan), or equal to (Bob) the section
they ended up in. The researchers again manipulated whether the students ended up in that section as a re-
sult of their own choice or as a result ofa computer reassignment. Participants were asked about possible
difierences in regret experienced by Alan and Bob. They were asked to indicate this on a scale that ranged
from -2 ("Bob feels much more regret than Alan") to 2("Alan feels much more regret than Bob"). In both
the student choice condition and the computer reassignment condition it was found that Alan was rated as
experiencing more regret. A problem with this measure is that it only informs us about the regret of Alan
compared to the regret of Bob, within one of the two decision agency conditions. Since the intensity of re-
gret was not directly assessed, this measure dces not provide any information about whether the overall
level of regret wa~ higher in the student choice enndition than in the computer reassignment condition.
Thus, the fact that Alan was seen as experiencing more regret than Bob in both conditions dces not imply
that the regret experienced following a unsatisfactory computer reassignment is equal in intensity to the
regret experienced following a unsatisfactory choice.
Our conviction that Connolly et aL (1997) would have found the predicted effects ofdecision agency
had they asked for intensity ratings ofregret is based on the findings of our own reseazch in which we have
focused on regret (Zeelenberg, 1996; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, 8c de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg á
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, 8c Manstead, in press; Zeelenberg 8r. van Dijk, 1997), disappoint-
ment (van Dijk 8c van der Pligt, 1997), or on the differences and similarities between these emotions (van
Dijk, van der Pligt, 8c Zeelenberg, 1998a, 19986; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, Bc van der Pligt, 1998c; Zeelenberg,
van den Bos, á van Dijk, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1998c; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, 8t van der Pligt,
1998a; 19986).
Regret and disappointment obviously have much in common; they are related to risky decision mak-
ing and uncertain outcomes, and originate in a comparison process in which the outcome obtained is com-
pared to an outcome that might have occurred. However, what we have found in our research is that there
are also clear differences between the two emotions. For example, we found that the investment of instru-
mental effort in achieving a goal amplifies experienced disappointment when the goal is not achieved, but at
the same time attenuates experienced regret (van Dijk et al., 1998a). ln another study we found that the ex-
perience of regret is positively associated with responsibility and internal attribution (i.e., the extent to
which we feel responsible for an outcome and perceive our own choices to be the cause of this outcome),
whereas the experience ofdisappointment is positively associated with external attribution (i.e., the extentRegret and responsibility 4
to which we perceive external events to be the cause ofthis outcome) (Zeelenberg et al., 1998c).
In short, we have repeatedly found evidence consistent with the notion that an important difference
between regret and disappointment resides in the processes giving rise to the emotions. Moreover, in a re-
cent study on the phenomenological experience of regret and disappointment we found that the two emo-
tions are not simply similar experiences that go by different names; they are distinct emotions, each with its
own characteristics (Zeelenberg, e! al., 1998a).
The relevance of our findings described above to Connolly er al.'s (1997) research is that our findings
show that it is important to be precise about the specific emotions under investigation (see, van der Pligt,
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, de Vries, 8r. Richard [1998], for a more comprehensive discussion of the need to be
specific in research on affect, attitudes, and decision making). Our research shows that a given manipulation
can have opposite etiects on regret and disappointment; that is, it may amplify one emotion and at the same
time attenuate the other. Moreover, these manipulations often do not have any impact on a measure of general
affect (e.g., van Dijk et al., 1998a; Zeelenberg et al., 1998c). The happiness assessment used by Connolly et
a!. may be considered as similar to the measure of general affect used in our own studies. The happiness
assessment might therefore be too general to be influenced by how an outcome came about, and too insensi-
tive to reflcct differences in regret. It might 6e the case that other negative emotions (e.A., disappointment)
also influence one's overall happiness with an outcome. Alternatively it might be the case that the emotion
happiness isjust not influenced by responsibility. This is the case for what Weiner and colleagues refer to as
`outcome dependent - attribution independent' emotions. According to these researchers "certain emotions
such as happiness and disappointment are independent of attributions but dependent on outcomes" (Weiner,
Russell, 8c Lerrnan, 1979, p. 1216).
In the present research we replicated the basic design of Connolly et al.'s (1979) experiments and
measured, in addition to overall happiness, the specific emotions regret and disappointment. We expected to
replicate Connolly et al.'s findings on the happiness measure. However, we expected ratings of regret to be
influenced by the manipulation of responsibility (i.e., decision agency). That ís, we expected higher regret
ratings when the outcomes were produced by the students' own choice than when they were produced by a
computer reassignment. The prediction for disappointment was more complex. Although Weiner et al.
(1979) argued that disappointment is an attribution independent emotion, our own research provided evi-
dence suggesting the opposite. For example, we have found that disappointment was negatively related to
responsibility (Zeelenberg et al. 1998c), and positively related to external attribution (van Dijk et al., 1998b;
Zeelenberg et al. 1998c). However, these relations were always weaker than those between regret and re-
sponsibility. In other research we have found no evidence for a relation between disappointment and re-
sponsibility, although a relation between regret and responsibility was present (van Dijk et al., 1998a). This
inconsistent pattern of results led us to predict that the responsibility manipulation would have a small effect
on disappointment, such that there would be greater disappointment when the negative outcome was caused
by a computer assignment than by the student's own choice.Regret and responsibility 5
Experiment 1
Method
Design and Purticipants. The experiment had the following design: 2(Decision Agent student choice
vs. computer assignment) x 3(Initial Condition: better than vs. equal to vs. worse than actual outcome),
with Initial Condition as within-subjects factor and Decision Agent as between-subjects factor. The depend-
ent variables were thejudged happiness, regret, and disappointment ofeach student in the scenario. We also
assessed perceived responsibility for the outcome to check whether the decision agency manipulation did
indeed inFluence responsibility. Sixty Dutch undergraduate students volunteered to participate in this ex-
periment. Thirty participants were randomly allocated to each of the Decision Agency conditions.
Procedureand Material. Participants were confronted with a scenario involving three students, Alan,
Bob and Chuck. This scenario was a closely based on the one used by Connolly et crl. (1997, p. 76) and pre-
sented in Dutch. The computer assignment version is presented here [the student choice variant is shown in
parentheses]:
Alan, Bob and Chuck register for a required undergraduate course. They are assigned to three different sections,
A, B, and C, [augh[ by three different instructors. Tbey have heard that [he sections differ widely in how interest-
ingly they are taugh[ and how eaSily they are Rraded. Due to unforeseen circums[ances the students have [o be
reassigned to the sectionsjust before the semester starts. The compu[er reassigned Alan to section B, Bob's as-
signment is unchanged, and Chuck is reassigned to section B. [or. After a great deal ofresearch, calling around,
and discussion with other students, Alan decides to change to section B, Bob decides to make no change, and
Chuck decides to change to section BJ. So all three students end up in the same section B. Section B turns out to
be an OK section, with fairly in[eresting lectures and a reasonable grade distribution. They la[er find out that
section A was terrific, with wonderful lectures and easy grades, and Ihat section C was a disaster, with dull, mo-
notonouslectures and very low grades.
After reading the scenario participants were asked to rate the happiness for each student on a I 1-point
scale with endpoints tabeled very unhappy (-5) and very happy (t5). This happiness scale was identical to
the one used by Connolly et nl. (1997). Next, participants were asked to rate the amount of regret and disap-
pointment each student felt. These were measured on 9-point scales with endpoints labeled no regret (1) and
very much regret (9), and no disappointment ( I) and very much disappointment (9). Finally, as a check on
the Decision Agent manipulation, participants were asked on a separate page to rate how responsible each
student was for being in section B. Participants were asked to make these ratings on 9-point scales with
endpoints labeled not responsible (1) and very responsible (9).
Results
Monipulation check. The mean responsibility ratings per condition are depicted in Table I. A 2
(Decision Agent: student choice vs. computer assignment) x 3(lnitial Condition: better than vs. equal to vs.
worse tltan actual outcome) ANOVA revealed the expected main effect of Decision Agent, F(1,58) - 45.53,
p ~.001, showing that participants perceived the students to be more responsible when the outcome
stemmed from the student's own choice than when it stemmed from a computer reassignment. The Decision
Agent manipulation thus appears to be an effective manipulation of responsibility. The analysis also yielded
a main effect for Initial Condition, F(2,116) - 19.58, p ~.001. This effect was qualified by the DecisionRegret and responsibility 6
Agen[ x Initial Condition interaction, F(2,116) - 14.78, p ~.001. Inspection of the means depicted in Table
I shows that all thc students were perceived as equally low in responsibility in the computer assignment
condition. Those in [he student choice condition were perceived as being more responsible, and within this
condition those who changed section, Alan and Chuck, were perceived as more responsible than Bob, the
one who did not change.
Table 1.
Mean Responsibiliry Ratings in Experiment I
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
Initiu( Condilion:
Better than (- Alan) 2.SOa 6.SOb
Equal to (- Bob) 2.33a 3.80c
Worse Ihan (- Chuck) 2.53a 6.176
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-poin[ scale, with endpoints labeled nn! responsible ( I) and very
respon.sihle (9). Means within rows and columns no[ sharing a common subscript differ signifi-
can[ly (p ~ .OS).
Huppiness. Mean happiness ratings are shown in Table Z. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of
Initial Condition, F(2, I 16) - 197.22, p ~ .001. Chuck wasjudged to be happier than Bob, who was judged to
be happier than Alan. No other effects were significant. This replicates the findings of Connolly et al.
Table 2.
Mean Happiness Ratings in Experiment I
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
htitia! Condition:
Betterthan(- Alan) -3.SOa -2.97a
Equal to (- Bob) -0.306 -0.47b
Worse than (- Chuck) 3.20c 2.47c
Note. Ratings were made on a 1 I-point scale, with endpoints labeled very unhappy (-5) and very
huppv (t5). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ significantly (p
~ .OS).
Regrel. Mean regret ratings are shown in Table 3. Here the ANOVA revealed the predicted main ef-
fect ofDecision Agent, F(1,58) - 29.49,p ~.001, indicating that there was more regret in the student choice
condition than in the computer assignment condition. The analysis also revealed a main effect of Initial
Condition, F(2,116) - 73.13, p ~.001, and a significant Decision Agent x Initial Condition interaction,
F(2,1 16) - 19.28, p ~.001. Inspection of the means depicted in Table 3 show that in both the student choice
condition and in the computer assignment condition Alan was judged to experience more regret than Bob,
who was judged to experience more regret than Chuck. The difference between the three actors (arising
from their initial condition) is, however, much more pronounced in the student choice condition.Rc,~ret and responsibility 7
Table 3.
Mean Regret Ratings in Experimen[ 1
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
Initial Condi[ion:
Better than (- Alan) 3.53a 7.23b
Equal to (- Bob) 2.70c 4.73d
Worse than (- Chuck) 2.10e 2.70e
Nae. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled no regret ( I ) and ve!v much
regret (9). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ significantly (p
~ .OS).
Disappointment. The mean disappointment ratings show a different pattem (see Table 4). The
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Initial Condition, F(2,116) - 187.89,p ~.001. Overall, Alan
was judged to experience more disappointment than Bob, who was judged to experience more disappoint-
ment than Chuck. Although the analysis did not reveal the predicted main effect for Decision Agent, F(1,58)
~ 1, a significant Dectsion Agent x Initial Condition interaction was found, F(2,116) - 9.70,p ~.001. The
means depicted in Table 4 show that the predicted effect of Decision Agent, that is, more disappointment in
the low responsibility condition, held for Alan, but not for Bob and Chuck. Note that Alan is the only stu-
dent who is really in a disappointing situation. The section he initially was assigned to was much better than
the mediocre section he ended up in, whereas Bob was originally assigned to this section, and Chuck moved
from a much worse section.
Table 4.
Mean Disappointment Ratings in Experiment I
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
h[iNal C'anditinn:
Better than (- Alan) 7.43a 6.lOb
Equal to (- Bob) 4.57c 4.93c
Worse than (- Chuck) 2.OOd 2.SOd
Note. Ra[ings were made on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled no disappointment (I) and very
much disappointment (9). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ
significantly (p ~ .OS).
Relations between the dependent variables. Table 5 shows the partial cotrelations between the de-
pendent variables in Experiment I. These correlations are corrected for the influence of the other two de-
pendent variables. The table shows these partial corcelations for each level of Initial Condition separately,
because this factor ~vas manipulated as a within-subjects variable. Inspection of Table 5 reveals that re-
sponsibility and regret were positively correlated in each condition, and that happiness and responsibility
sltowed no correlation at all. The corcelations between disappointment and responsibility were less consis-Regre[ and responsibility 8
tent. In the condition where the outcome is most disappointing (i.e., where the initial condition was better
than the obtained outcome) the correlation was negative, showing that the less responsible one is judged to
be, the more disappointment one is judged to feel. For the other two levels of initial condition there was no
correlation between perceived responsibility and ratings of disappointment. All these correlations are in line
with the tindings described earlier and with our theoretical predictions.
Table 5.
Par[ialCorrelationsBetween [he Dependenr Variables per Initial Condition in Experiment 1
Initial C'ondition: Better than (- Alan) Equal to (- Bob) Worse than (- Chuck)
Resp. Happ. Regret Disap. Resp. Happ. Regret Disap. Resp. Happ.Regre[ Disap.
Responsibility -- -- --
Happiness -.081 -- 035 -- -.080 --
Regret 628' -.042 -- 540' -.047 -- 294' -.045 --
Disappointment -.245' -.623' -.012 -- 094 -.526' 220' -- -.006 -.260' 675'
Note. Entries are partial correlations between two dependent variables, cortected for the remaining two variables;
' - p ~ .OS (one-tailed).
This hïings us [o [he question nf hoW the different emotional reactions are related to one another.
More specifically, how does overall happiness with the obtained decision outcome relate to the ratings of
regret and disappointment? One of the possibilities proposed earlier is that overall happiness with the out-
come is influenced by both regret and disappointment, and that the two influences cancel each other out. An
alternative possibility is that happiness is an `outcome dependent - attribution independent' emotion (cf.
Weiner et al., 1979). The partial correlations seem to support the latter notion. This is not only because there
are no correlations between responsibility and happiness, but also because regret does not correlate with
Itappiness, as would be required by the first explanation. Unlike regret, disappointment was found to corre-
late negatively with happiness.
Discussion
The results of this experiment clearly show the predicted effect of decision agency on regret when the
intensity ofregret was assessed more directly. The results also replicate Connolly et al.'s(1997) finding that
happiness is not influenced by decision agency. In addition, the results indicate that when the obtained out-
come was worse than the outcome forgone, disappointment may be affected by decision agency in a differ-
ent way than regret. The student whose outcome was worse than the original allocation was rated as feeling
more disappointed when the negative outcome was caused by a computer reassignmen[ than when it arose
from his own choice. The results ofcorrelational analyses were in accordance with Ihese findings.
Experiment 2
In Experiment I participants rated the happiness, regret, disappointment and responsibility of the
three different actors in the scenario. The difference between the actors was the initial section chosen or
assigned to. This within-subjects manipulation of Initial Condition may have resulted in a tendency for theRegret and responsibility 9
participants to overstate the differences in reactions following the different initial conditions. It might be
argued that this could have affected the findings regarding the impact of decision agency, and also the corre-
lations between the dependent variables. The purpose ofExperiment 2 was to test the predictions concerning
the relation between regret and responsibility in a completely between-subjects design. In the present ex-
periment Ini[ial condition had only two levels (see alsq Connolly et al.'s [ 1997] Experiments I and 3).
Merhod
Design and Participan[s. The experiment had the following completely between-subjects factorial
design: 2(Decision Agent: student choice vs. computer assignment) x 2(Initial Condition: better than vs.
equal to actual outcome). The dependent variables were identical to those in Experiment I. Eighty Dutch
undergraduate students volunteered to participate in this experiment, which was part of a larger experimen-
tal session. There were 20 participants in each condition. They were paid I S Dutch Guilders (approximately
á7.50) for their participation.
Procedureand Material. Since Initial Condition and Decision Agency were manipulated as between-
subjects factors, participants were confronted with a scenario involving only one student, Alan. The scenar-
ios were presented in Dutch. The computer assignment version in which the initial condition was better than
the obtained outcome is presented here [the variant in which the initial condition was equal to the obtained
outcome is shown in parentheses]:
Alan registers for a required undergraduate course. He is assigned to section A. [He is assigned to section B.]
There are two different sections, A and B, taught by three different instructors. He has heard that the sections dif-
fer widely in how interestingly they are taught and how easily they are graded. Due to unforeseen circumstances
all students have to be reassigned to the sections just before the semester starts. The computer reassigned Alan to
sec[ion B. [Alan's assignment is unchanged]. Section B tums out to be an OK section, with fairly in[eresting
lectures and a reasonable grade distribution. Alan later fnds out that section A was tertific, with wonderful lec-
[ures and easy grades.
In the Student Choice conditions participants read that Alan made his decision "after a great deal of
research, calling around, and discussion with other students," as was the case in the student choice condi-
tions in Experiment 1 and in Connolly et al.'s ( 1997) experiments. After reading the scenario participants
were asked to rate the happiness, regret, disappointment and responsibility for Alan, on the same scales that
were used in Experiment l.
Results
Manipulation check. The mean responsibility ratings per condition are shown in Table 6. A 2
(Decision Agent: student choice vs. computer assignment) x 2(Initial Condition: better than vs. equal to
actual outcome) ANOVA revealed the expected main effect of Decision Agent, F(1,79) - 100.23, p ~.001,
showing that participants perceived the student as more responsible when the outcome stemmed from his
own choice than when it stemmed from a computer reassignment. The Decision Agent manipulation thus
again appeared to be an effective manipulation ofresponsibility. The analysis did not yield a main effect for
Initial Condition, F(1,79) - 0.01, ns., and the Decision Agent x Initial Condition interaction was only mar-
ginally significant, F( 1,79) - 3.92,p ~ .10.Regret and responsibility 10
Table 6.
Mean ResponsibiJity Ratings in E.rperiment ?
Decision ,9gent
Computer Assignment Studen[ Choice
Inilicrl Condilinn:
Better than I.80a 7.l Ob
Equal to 2.70a 6.256
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled not responsible ( I) and verv re-
rporuibfe (9). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ significantly
(p ~ .OS).
Happines.s. Mean happiness ratings are shown in Table 7. The ANOVA revealed a marginally signifi-
cant main effect of Initial Condition, F(1,79) - 2.96, p ~.10. Alan wasjudged as less happy (or, more pre-
cisely, as more unhappy) when his initial condition was better, rather than to equal to, the section he ended
up in. No other effects were significant.
Table 7.
Mean Happiness Ratings in Experiment 2
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
Gtilial Condition:
Better than -2.80a -2.40a
Equal to -2.30a -2.30a
Nore. Ratings were made on a 1 I-point scale, with endpoints labeled very unhappv (-5) and very
happv (f5). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ significantly (p
~ .OS).
Regre[. Mean regret ratings are shown in Table 8. Here the ANOVA revealed the predicted main ef-
fect of Decision Agent, F(1,79) - 47.72, p ~.001, indicating that there was more regret in the student choice
condition than in the computer assignment condition. No other effects were significant.
Table 8.
Mean Regret Ratings in Experiment l
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
Initia! Condition:
Better than 2.95a 7.706
Equal to 3.20a 6.106
Nore. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled no regret (1) and very much re-
grer (9). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ at p ~.05.
Disappointment. The mean disappointment ratings again show a different pattern (see Table 9). The
ANOVA revealed the predicted main effect for Decision Agent, F(1,79) - 20.63, p ~.001, indicating thatRegret and responsibility I I
there was more disappointment in the computer assignment condition than in the student choice condition.
The analysis also revealed a marginally significant main effect for Initial Condition, F(1,79) - 2.86,p ~.10,
suggesting that Alan wasjudged to experience more disappointment when his initial condition was better, as
compared to equal to, the one he ended up in. The interaction was not significant.
Table 9.
Mean Uisuppuintment Ratings in E.rperiment 2
Decision Agent
Computer Assignment Student Choice
Initia! Condition:
Better than 7.30a
7.15a
6.15b
S.IOb Equal to
Nore. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled no disappointmenr (I) and very
much disappointmenr (9). Means within rows and columns not sharing a common subscript differ
significantly (p ~ .OS).
Relations between the dependent vcmiables. Table 10 shows [he partial correlations between the four
dependent variables measured in Experiment 2. Again, responsibility and happiness were not related, while
responsibili[y and regret were positively related. [n the present experiment we also found a negative corre-
lation between responsibility and disappointment, such that the lower [he perceived responsibility for the
outcome, the higher the disappointment. The relations between happiness and regret, and happiness and
disappointment were similar to those in Experiment I. Happiness was again not related to regret, whereas it
was negatively related to disappointment.
Table 10.
Parlia! Correlations Between the Dependent Variab(es in Experiment 2
Responsibility Happiness Regret Disappointment
Responsibility --
Happiness 066 --
Regret .636' -.026 --
Disappointment -.189' -.466' -.154'
Nnte. Entries are partial correla[ions between two dependent variables, corrected for the remaining two variables; '- p ~
OS (one-tailed).
Discus.sion
The results ofthis experiment replicate the findings of Experiment I, again showing that a manipula-
tion of decision agency does not have an impact on happiness with the decision outcome, but at the same
time does have a strong effect on a more direct assessment of regret. Correlational analyses confirm these
findings by showing a positive relation between regret and responsibility, and no relation between happiness
and responsibility.
An additional finding of Experiment 2 is that the effects of Initial Condition do not seem to occurRegret and responsibility 12
when it is manipulated as a between-subjects factor. This suggests that tha effects of actionlinaction manipu-
lations and change of status quo manipulations are less robust than is assumed in the literature. We will
return to this point in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
In a series of experiments Connolly, Ordónez and Coughlan (1997) manipulated whether three stu-
dents arrived at an outcome through Iheir own decision or through a"computer assignment" procedure over
which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation had no effect on regret as measured by
asking participants to rate each student's overall happiness or unhappiness with the outcome obtained. On
the basis that this is not an appropriate measure of regret, we replicated the basic design of Connolly et al.'s
experiments and found the predicted effect ofdecision agency on regret when it was directly measured. At
the same time we replicated Connolly et al.'sfinding that decision agency does not influence general happi-
ness. Moreover, a measure of disappointment resulted in the opposite effect, as predicted.
Contrary to the findings ofConnolly et al. (1997), the present research shows clear effects of respon-
sibility on regret. These findings are consistent with those of Gilovich and Medvec (1994), Frijda et a1.
(1989), and our own previous research on regret and disappointment. Together this evidence provides a
strong case for a conceptualization of regret that includes the notion ofresponsibility for the regretted out-
come. We argue that the case for this conclusion is particularly strong in view of the lack of evidence that
regret is unrelated to responsibility.
These findings emphasize the need to be precise about the emotion under investigation. As we have
shown, a given factor (in this case responsibility) can increase the experience of one emotion (regret), de-
crease the experience of another emotion (disappointment), but at the same time have no influence on a
more general emotional reaction (overall happiness). Which emotion one measures therefore has an impor-
tant bearing on the conclusions one draws regarding the influence ofsuch a factor on emotion.
This need for specificity may also be applicable to an issue that is related to the one addressed in the
present article, namely the relation between actionlinaction effects and change of status quo effects (Baron
á Ritov, 1994; Gilovich á Medvec, 1995; Kahneman 8c Tversky, 1992; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Landman,
1986; Ritov Bc Baron, 1990, 1992, 1995; Spranca, Minsk, 8c Baron, 1991; Schweitzer, 1994, 1995). Previous
studies have shown that affective reactions to decision outcomes are influenced by whether the outcome is
the result of a decision to act or a decision not to act; generally the outcome produced by action results in
more extreme affective reactions. It has also been found that outcomes that are the result ofa change of the
status quo result in more extreme affective reactions than outcomes that are the result of not changing the
status quo. A number of studies have tried to disentangle these two effects (e.g., Baron 8c Ritov, 1994; Ritov
8r Baron, 1992; Schweitzer, 1994). Although the focus ofthe present research is on the role of responsibility
in regret, we also manipulated the initial section the students were assigned to (cf. Connolly et al., 1997).
T'his initial condition could be seen as a status quo, and may serve as a reference point with which the ob-Regret and responsibilit}' 13
tained outcome can be compared. Moreover, deviations from the status quo can be seen as actions in the
student choice condi[ions, but not in the computer reassignment conditions. In this way our experiments can
also be regarded as relevant to status quo and actionlinaction effects. The differences in affect between the
different Icvels of initial condition within the computer assignment condition reflect a pure change of status
quo effect. However, the difference in affect between the different levels of initial condition within the stu-
dent choice condition reFlect both the change of status quo effect and the actionlinaction effect (because
here the change of status quo involves an action of the student). By comparing these two conditions we can
see how much the actionlinaction effect adds to the change of status quo effect (Schweit2er [1994] argued
tha[ these effects are additive). What do our results show?
First, they show that the conclusions one draws are very much dependent on whether initial condition
is manipulated as a within or between-subjects factor. In Experimen[ 2, where we manipulated initial condi-
tion as between-subjects factor, we found no reliable effects of initial condition. Thus, the initial condition
only mattered when information was provided about another actor whose initial status quo was different.
This suggests that actionlinaction effects and status quo effects are dependent on comparison processes.
This is in line with findings recently reported by N'gbala and Branscombe (1997); they also failed to find
actionlinaction effect in a between-subjects design, and suggested tlmt attionlinaetion effeets might be due
to a comparative judgment process that is induced by the use of a within-subject manipulation of ac-
tionlinaction. If N'gbala and Branscombe's alternative account for actionlinaction effects is correct, it may
also apply to change of status quo effects, since we found no evidence ofthese effects when this factor was
manipulated as a between-subjects factor.
Second, if we limit ourselves to Experiment I, in which actionlinaction effects and status quo effects
were found, our results show that the conclusions that can be drawn are different for the different emotions.
The happiness data of Experiment 1 show the same change of status quo effects in both the student choice
condition and the computer assignment condition, suggesting that actionlinaction effects do not add some-
thing to the change of status quo effects. But when one considers Ihe regret data,the actionlinaction effect
clearly did add significantly to the change of status quo effect..
In sum, our results suggest that the existence of these effects is dependent on whether factors are ma-
nipulated within-subjects or between-subjects. Moreover, the success of attempts to disentangle ac-
tionlinaction effects from status quo effects may depend on the specific dependent variable under investiga-
tion. These findings have clear implcations for future research taht tries to disentangle these effects.
One could question whether the focus on specific emotions that we adopt illuminates psychological
processes as opposed to linguistic ones. That is, does the fact that results vary depending on the emotion
being assessed inform us about the psychology of emotions and tlteir role in decision making, or does it
simply show that people know when to use a given emotion word? We wish to argue that it is informative
about psychological processes. The focus on specific emotions is important because each emotion has its
own characteristic phenomenology (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, Wiest, á Swartz, 1994). This is alsoRegret and responsibility 14
truc of regret and disappointment, the two emotions that are most relevant in the context of decision making
(Zeelenberg el al., 1998a). These differences in phenomenology suggest that the two emotions play different
roles in decision making. Being specific about which emotion one is investigating is not only important
when identifying factors that influence that specific emotion. Such specificity is also important because of
the differential effects on decision making that different emotions may have. This is what we turn to next.
lmplicarinnsjor decision making
The influence of the anticipation of emotions on decision making is the topic of regret and disap-
poin[ment theories (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes 8c Sugden, 1982, 1986). There is now ample evidence that
anticipated regret influences decision making. For example, Simonson (1992) asked consumers to imagine
the regret they would feel after choosing behveen two options and then finding that the rejected option
would have been the better one. Asking consumers to generate these behavioral-prefactuals made them
more likely to purchase an item that would shield them from this possible regret (i.e., a higher-priced, well-
known brand), over a potentially better item (a less expensive, but lesser-known brand) (see Richard et al.,
1996, for similar findings). Central in current research on regret is the concept of feedback on unchosen
options. It lias been found that people choose in such a way that they avoid feedback that could result in
regret (e.g., Ritov, 1996 Ritov 8r Baron, 1995). Zeelenberg e! al. (199á; see also Inmau 8c Zcelenberg, 1998;
Zeelenberg 8c Beattie, 1997) have shown that the anticipation of regret can promote risk-seeking as well as
risk-avoiding choices, depending on which choice would minimize the possible regret. Thus, the anticipa-
tion of regret results in choices that protect the decision maker from possible feedback about foregone op-
portunities.
There is less research on anticipated disappointment. We predict, however, a relationship between the
anticipation ofthis emotion and risk aversion. Bell's definition of disappointment as a"psychological reac-
tion to an outcome that dces not match up to expectations" (Bell, 1985, p. I) implies that risky options have
much potential to create disappointment (Inman, Dyer, á Jia, 1997; van Dijk 8r, van der Pligt, 1997). Safe
options leading to a certain outcome that is known in advance carry no risk of disappointment. One already
knows the outcome, and therefore the outcome is the expectation. Outcomes of risky options, by contrast,
can fall short of the expectation level, thereby resulting in disappointment. For this reason, the anticipation
of disappointment should reduce the amount of risk that individuals are willing to take.
When people make decisions they may anticipate the emotions they could experience as a conse-
quence of those decisions. As the present research has shown, some factors may amplify one emotion, with-
out influencing another emotion. The same factor can even attenuate a third emotion. This suggests that the
influence of emotions on decision making is very much dependent on [he specific emotion that one is an-
ticipating. Someone who anticipates regret might be inclined to make conventional decisions that are
(because they are conventional) accompanied by less responsibility. Not feeling responsible for decision
outcomes is one way to protect yourself from regret. Someone who anticipates disappointment, by contrast,
might take steps to gain control and thereby enhance a sense of responsibility, because negative outcomesRegret and responsibility IS
over which you had little control give ris'e to more disappointment than identical outcomes over which you
had control. These are predictions that could be tested in future research.
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